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Notes
BOLING V. ROMER: 1 FEDERAL COURTS CONDONE FORCED
WITHDRAWAL OF BLOOD FOR DNA DATA BANKS
DESPITE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
I. INTRODUCTION
As scientific knowledge and technology advance, the collection
and storage of human tissues escalates.2 The increased prevalence of
human tissue collection has been greatly motivated by the wide variety
of purposes it serves. For example, the United States military stores
soldiers' blood samples with the alleged intent to retain them for such
purposes as wartime identification,3 and State agencies and health
care facilities store Guthrie cards,4 umbilical-cord blood,' and tissue
samples from newborns.6 Today's growing trend in law enforcement
encourages and often mandates the development of deoxyribonucleic
1. 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied.
2. See GeorgeJ. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting Coded "Future Diaries,"
270 JAMA 2346 (1993).
3. See Jon F. Merz, Psychosocial Risks of Storing and Using Human Tissues in Research, 8
RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENV'T. 235, 235 (1997) (citing Mayfield v. Dalton, 901 F. Supp. 300
(D. Haw. 1995)).
4. Guthrie cards are filter paper discs impregnated with capillary blood and varying
amounts of phenylalanine controls, named after American microbiologist Robert Guthrie.
See MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2088 (15th ed. 1987). The Guthrie inhibi-
tion assay uses Guthrie cards to test for high plasma phenylalanine (Phe) level together
with a normal or low plasma tyrosine (Tyr). See DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 723 (28th
ed. 1988). The test is used to detect phenylketonuria (PKU), "a condition in which metab-
olism of the amino acid Phe is deficient, producing increased Phe in the body with result-
ing nerve and brain cell damage and severe mental retardation." MELLONI'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 371 (2nd ed. 1985). States and other agencies store dried blood spots on
Guthrie cards in state newborn-screening laboratories. See Jean E. McEwen & Philip R.
Reilly, Stored Guthrie Cards as DNA "Banks", 55 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 196, 196 (1994).
5. See Moshe Zilberstein, Umbilical-Cord-Blood Banking: Lessons Learned from Gamete Do-
nation, 349 LANCET 642, 642 (1997) (indicating that states and other agencies store human
umbilical-cord blood for various scientific research). Presently, the practice is experimen-
tal and raises many privacy concerns, particularly ownership and consent, as the mother
consents for she and the minor-newborn. See id. at 643.
6. See Merz, supra note 3, at 235; see also McEwen & Reilly, supra note 4; Eliot Marshall,
Clinical Promise, Ethical Quandary, 271 SCL 586 (1996); Jeremy Sugarman et al., Ethical As-
pects of Banking Placental Blood for Bone Marrow Transplantation, 274 JAMA 1783 (1995); and
Martha M. Knoppers & Claude M. Laberge, Research and Stored Tissues: Persons as Sources,
Samples as Persons?, 274 JAMA 1806 (1995).
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acid (DNA) 7 data banks.' DNA evidence "can establish to a virtual
certainty the presence or the absence of a defendant at the scene of a
crime."9 DNA, found in every human body cell except red blood cells,
is the chemical dispatcher for genetic information. 10 Each human
cell contains an identical DNA configuration." More important,
"with the exception of identical twins, no two individuals have the
same DNA configuration." 12 The significance is readily apparent:
DNA is individual to each and every person. Thus, DNA fingerprint-
ing'" technology enhances the forensic sciences, and the resulting ac-
curacy of this evidence aids in positively identifying suspects in
criminal cases involving human blood, fluid, or tissue.' 4 Criminal law
enforcement data banks draw blood samples from prison inmates to
store DNA evidence in the form of blood or skin tissue.15 Almost half
of the state legislatures have adopted some form of a DNA data bank,
and in 1994, Congress approved the DNA Identification Act' 6 which
appropriated in excess of forty million dollars over a five-year period
to encourage states to establish and maintain DNA data banks.' 7 This
new trend in establishing these data banks, raises serious issues and
questions involving an individual's privacy rights.
7. In 1953, James Watson and Francis H. C. Crick discovered the structure of the DNA
molecule by using X-ray data and rules of composition. See George Bundy Smith &Janet A.
Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 65 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2465,
2465 (1997). In 1962, Watson and Crick received the Nobel Prize for their discovery. See
id.
8. See generally, Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the
Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REv. 49 (1995).
9. Smith & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2465.
10. See id. DNA is the "nucleic acid ... constituting the primary genetic material of all
cellular organisms." DORLAND'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 444 (28th ed. 1988).
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. The process is most often called DNA fingerprinting, as the term was coined by Dr.
Alec Jeffreys, a pioneer in this area, but it is also known as DNA typing or profiling, among
other names. SeeJames P. O'Brien, Jr., Note, DNA Fingerprinting: The Virginia Approach, 35
WM. & MARY L. REv. 767, 767 n.1 (1994) (citing to Sally E. Renskers, Note, Trial by Certainty:
Implications of Genetic "DNA Fingerprinting, "39 EMORY L.J. 309, 309 n.3 (1990)); see also Yale
H. Yee, Note, Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law Enforcement or Threat to Individual
Privacy? 22 AM.J. CmiM. L. 461, 462 (1995).
14. See O'Brien, supra note 13, at 767.
15. See id. at 86.
16. DNA Identification Act § 210304, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 1994 HR 3355, 108 Stat.
1796 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (1994)).
17. See Krent, supra note 8, at 86. The DNA Identification Act of 1994 allocates forty
million dollars in federal matching grants to states for DNA analysis activities and autho-
rizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director to establish a national DNA identi-
fication index. SeeJean E. McEwen, Forensic DNA Data Banking by State Crime Laboratories, 56
AM.J. HUM. GENETICS 1487, 1487 (1995). The national index, the Combined DNA Identifi-
cation System (CODIS), began as a pilot program in 1990. See id.
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II. THE CASE
In Boling v. Romer, a 1996 decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, concurring with the lower court, found that the extraction,
analysis, and storage of DNA from prison inmates convicted of a sex
offense constituted a reasonable search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment."s The Tenth Circuit based its finding on an inmate's
diminished privacy rights, the minimal intrusion of the blood tests,
and "the legitimate government interest in the investigation and pros-
ecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a
manner not significantly different from the use of fingerprints.""
One month later, the Tenth Circuit denied rehearing on the issues of
the forced withdrawal of blood for state legislated-DNA data banks,
and the restriction of individual privacy rights.2"
In Boling, plaintiff-appellant Jason Aaron Boling challenged the
constitutionality of a Colorado statute that required inmates convicted
of a sexual assault offense to provide the state with DNA samples
before their release on parole.2 1 Boling also challenged the Colorado
Department of Corrections' (DOC) policies toward the implementa-
tion of that statute.22 The Colorado statute provides in pertinent part:
As a condition of parole, ... any offender convicted of an
offense for which the factual basis involved a sexual assault
.. [must] submit to chemical testing of his blood to deter-
mine the genetic markers thereof and to chemical testing of
his saliva to determine the secretor status thereof. Such test-
ing shall occur prior to the offender's release from incarcera-
tion, and the results thereof shall be filed with and
maintained by the Colorado bureau of investigation. The re-
18. Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied (convicting in-
mates under Colorado Revised Statute section 17-2-201(5) (g)). The Fourth Amendment
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Krent, supra note 8, at 49.
19. Boling, 101 F.3d at 1340.
20. See id. at 1336; see also Schlicher v. (NFN) Peters, I & I, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir.
1996) (tenth circuit ruling twenty-eight days after Bolingwhere the court again ruled that
requiring certain convicted felons to provide blood and saliva specimens for a DNA data
bank was a reasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment).
21. See id. at 1338 (claiming that DOC policies were inconsistent with the language of
Colorado Revised Statute section 17-2-201 (5) (g)); see also infra note 23 and accompanying
text.
22. See Boling, F.3d at 1338.
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sults of such tests shall be furnished to any law enforcement
agency upon request.23
Boling's suit in the District of Colorado raised federal claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983,24 198525 and 1988.26
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. DNA Data Banks Developed from DNA Fingerprinting
As DNA technology continues to advance, courts are beginning
to accept and rely upon the validity and reliability of DNA evidence.27
For instance, DNA evidence has been used to exonerate twenty-eight
convicts including some sentenced to death;21 the first-ever U.S. exe-
cution based on DNA tests occurred following a DNA-based convic-
tion of a serial rapist-murderer; 29 and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) matched the DNA of a defendant in the World
Trade Center bombing from saliva found on an envelope sent to The
New York Times.30 As news of these investigations became public
knowledge, state legislatures quickly accepted DNA-based evidence as
"a reliable scientific technique," and many states passed statutes au-
thorizing the use of such evidence "to prove or disprove one's
identification." "
23. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17 -2-201(5)(g)(i) (West 1990).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (authorizing civil actions for the deprivation of rights, priv-
ileges, or immunities protected under the U.S. Constitution and laws). See Boling, 101 F.3d
at 1338.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1994) (authorizing possible action for recovery of damages
against those who conspire to interfere with individual's civil rights). See Boling, 101 F.3d at
1338.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994) (authorizing proceedings in vindication of civil rights in
conformity with the Constitution and laws). See Boling, 101 F.3d at 1338.
27. See O'Brien, supra note 13, at 767.
28. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996); see also
Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent
Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'v & L. 439, 439 (1997).
29. See Giannelli, supra note 28, at 439, 478 n.2 (citing Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229
(4th Cir. 1994)). The Spencer court matched the DNA found in the defendant's blood to
the seminal fluid found on the victim. See id.
30. See id. at 439-40. DNA tests found defendant Nidal Ayyad's DNA matched the DNA
from the saliva found on the envelope containing a letter to the New York Times proclaim-
ing the Liberation Army, 5th Battalion, had bombed the World Trade Center in response
to U.S. aid to Israel. Id, at 478 n.3; see also generally Andrew Blum, Trade Center Case Turns on
Forensics, 16 NAT'L L.J. 8 (1993).
31. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 767-68 (quoting from Virginia Code section 19.2-270.5);
see infra note 33 for citations to state statutes adopting DNA-based evidence and DNA data
banks.
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B. Courts Have Upheld DNA Data Bank Legislation
Based upon the reliability and successes of DNA evidence, state
legislatures have enacted DNA fingerprinting and data banking stat-
utes.3 2 Currently, thirty-two states enacted laws which authorize the
formation of criminal DNA data banks.3 3 The majority of these stat-
utes establish criminal DNA data banks to aid law enforcement in
identifying and convicting sex offenders. 34 However, these statutes,
enacted under a state's exercise of its police power, arguably infringe
privacy interests, and lawsuits were filed to challenge the constitution-
ality of these statutes. 35 "The nation's courts have heard multifarious
constitutional challenges to forensic DNA data bank statutes, and yet
all state and federal courts agree that the statutes are constitutional."3 6
One by one, the courts have upheld the constitutionality of forcibly
extracting convicted sex offenders' blood for inclusion in state man-
dated DNA data banks.37 In 1992, the Fourth Circuit decided on this
issue in Jones v. Murray.8 In this case, Virginia prison inmates chal-
lenged a Virginia data bank law, essentially arguing that the data bank
law violated their Fourth Amendment rights.39 The Fourth Circuit
held that the Virginia legislation did not equate to an unreasonable
32. See O'Brien, supra note 13, at 767-68.
33. See ALA. CODE § 36-18-24 (1996); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-281 (West 1997); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290.2 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17 -2-201(g) (i) (West 1997);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5 4-102g (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4713 (1997); FLA.
STAT. ANN. ch. 943.325 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-60 (1997); HAw. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 706-603 (Michie 1997); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4-3 (West 1997); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 13.10 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (1996); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.170
(Banks-Baldwin 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:535, 15:536, 15:578 (West 1992); MD.
CODE ANN., art. 88B, § 12A (1994); MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520m (West 1991);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 299C.155 (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 650.050 (West 1997); NEV.
REv. STAT. § 179A.075 (1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-20.17 (West 1997); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 995-c (McKinney 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-266 to 266.12 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-13-05 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 150.27a (West 1995); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 181.085 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23-5-15 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-
113 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-212.4 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Michie
1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 43.43.752 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-4 (1997); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 165.77 (West 1997).
34. See Michael J. Markett, Note, Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA
Data Banks, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 185, 192 (1996).
35. See infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
36. Markett, supra note 34, at 222-23.
37. See Krent, supra note 8, at 86.
38. 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 472 (1992).
39. See id at 303. Tide 19.2 of the Code of Virginia "requires convicted felons to sub-
mit blood samples for DNA analysis 'to determine identification characteristics specific to
the person' and provides for the creation of a data bank of the information for future law
enforcement purposes." VA. CODE ANN. 1950 § 19.2-310.2 (Michie 1997); see also Jones, 962
F.2d at 303. For the text of the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 18.
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search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment because prison in-
mates have a diminished expectation of privacy and the extraction of
blood samples is a minimal intrusion.4 ° Moreover, the court found
the state's legitimate governmental interest in combating and deter-
ring felony recidivism outweighed the statute's minimal intrusion.4 1
One year later in Ewell v. Murray, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed Jones
and once again upheld the Virginia law.4 2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266
(1995) .43
In 1995, the Ninth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of an Ore-
gon statute requiring all inmates convicted of murder or sex offenses
to submit DNA samples for inclusion in a state data bank.44 Similar to
the Fourth Circuit's findings in Jones, the Ninth Circuit determined
that the extraction of blood is a reasonable search and seizure because
it is a minimal intrusion outweighed by the state government's legiti-
mate interest to prevent recidivism and to identify and prosecute mur-
derers and sex offenders.45
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits upheld the constitutional chal-
lenges to the Virginia and Oregon statutes, respectively. Despite con-
stitutional concerns over privacy interests and fears of abuse and
misuse, the courts condone the forced withdrawal of blood for DNA
data banks.46 The courts' acceptance of this new legislation prompted
the Tenth Circuit's rationale for its decision in Boling.
IV. SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING
In Boling, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of Colo-
rado's DNA data bank law under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and
40. See Jones, 962 F.2d. at 310-11.
41. See id. Recidivism is defined as repeated or habitual crime. BLACK'S LAw DIcrION-
ARY 1269 (6th ed. 1990).
42. Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2112 (1994). In
1994, the Eastern District of North Carolina followed the Fourth Circuit and upheld a
North Carolina DNA data bank statute
43. See Sanders v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994). In this case, North Caro-
lina prison inmates challenged the state DNA data bank law, claiming that non-voluntary
prisoners forced to give blood samples, violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. See id. at 498. The court held that inmates could be forced to give blood
samples for a DNA identification data bank. See id. at 501-02. The court found that indi-
vidualized suspicion was not necessary to obtain samples and that use of reasonable force
to ensure compliance was not unconstitutional, since it was not applied for purpose of
causing harm or punishment. See id. at 499.
44. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1564 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1554
(1996).
45. See id. at 1558-62.
46. See generally Jones, 962 F.2d 302; Rise, 59 F.3d 1556.
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Fourteenth Amendments. 47 As to the Fourth Amendment claim, the
Tenth Circuit followed the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' decisions in
Jones and Rise, respectively.4" The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
Colorado DNA statute mandating blood samples be drawn for data
banking was a Fourth Amendment search and seizure.49 However, in
line with both Jones and Rise, the Tenth Circuit found the taking of
blood samples-the search-to be reasonable.5" The Tenth Circuit
based its reasonableness finding on an inmate's diminished privacy
rights,51 the minimal intrusion of blood and saliva tests,52 and the le-
gitimate government interest in the investigation and prosecution of
unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in a manner not
significantly different from the use of fingerprints.5" The Tenth Cir-
cuit denied the Fifth Amendment claim holding that DNA samples do
not amount to self-incrimination because blood samples are not testi-
monial in nature. 4
47. See Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1338-41 (10th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied
48. See id. at 1339-40.
49. See id. at 1339; see also, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (-... physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes [a reason-
able] expectation of privacy"). In Skinner, railway labor organizations challenged the Fed-
eral Railroad Administration's regulations for drug and alcohol testing of railway
employees. See id. at 612. The U.S. Supreme Court found the testing reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment, despite neither a warrant nor reasonable suspicion requirement,
mainly because the government's compelling interest to protect public safety and com-
merce outweighed the limited intrusions upon railway employees' privacy. See id. at 633.
50. See Boling, 101 F.3d. at 1339-40.
51. See id. (noting, similar to Jones, that inmates have a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in the prison setting); see also Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560 ("once a person is convicted of one
of the felonies . . . he has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying
information derived from the blood sampling."); Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir.
1989) (per curiam), cert. denied 493 U.S. 1059 (1990) (stating that "plaintiff's privacy ex-
pectation in his body is further reduced by his incarceration").
52. See Boling, 101 F.3d. at 1339-40 (noting, similar to Jones and Rise, that a blood test is
a minimal bodily intrusion analogous to fingerprinting).
53. See id. (noting, similar to Jones and Rise, that a balancing test is utilized weighing the
minimal intrusion against the state's legitimate interest in identifying criminals and reduc-
ing recidivism).
54. See id. at 1340; see also Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that urine samples used for drug testing are not testimonial in nature, hence not sub-
ject to Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination). The Supreme
Court has held that a blood sample is physical evidence, which is not covered by the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. See Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 760-61 (1966) (holding that a state taking blood samples by common medi-
cal procedures from persons suspected of drunk driving "involves virtually no risk, trauma,
or pain"). The Fifth Amendment privilege protects only testimonial or communicative
evidence. See id. Thus, the state may require a person to produce blood samples. See id. at
771-72.
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
As to the Eighth Amendment claim, Boling argued that he would
be exposed to physical abuse from other inmates if he was forced to
submit to DNA Tests, thus disclosing he was a sex offender.55 The
Tenth Circuit found these allegations were insufficient to support an
Eighth Amendment claim.56 The court did not describe Boling's
Ninth Amendment argument, but simply found the claim "too vague
and conclusory." 7 And, the Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion claim that only sex offenders were targeted depriving them of
equal protection of the laws was defeated by the Tenth Circuit's ra-
tional basis test.5 s The court reasoned that "a rational relationship
exists between the government's decision to classify sex offenders and
the government's stated objective to investigate and prosecute un-
solved and future sex crimes.
59
V. ANALYSiS
Boling symbolizes the reduction of individual privacy rights. De-
spite state and federal courts' contention that governmental interests
outweigh the nonconsensual bodily intrusion, legislative statutes al-
lowing states to forcibly extract blood from inmates and store their
DNA types in a government data bank invade an individual's privacy.
A. Constitutional Right to Privacy Challenged: Forcible Extraction of an
Inmate's Blood for DNA Samples Constitutes an Unreasonable
Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable po-
lice searches and seizures.60 The Tenth Circuit, and other circuits
before it,61 held that the extraction of blood samples from inmates for
55. See Boling, 101 F.3d at 1341. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
56. See id.
57. Id at 1340. The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
58. See id. at 1341. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
59. Boling, 101 F.3d at 1341.
60. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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DNA fingerprinting was a reasonable search and seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.62 However, in spite of these holdings, there is
still a question as to whether the search and seizure is truly reason-
able. The lack of a warrant and probable cause, along with the viola-
tion of bodily integrity, call into question the court's reasonableness
finding.
1. Warrant and Probable Cause Requirements of the Fourth Amendment
The DNA data bank statutes lack both the warrant and probable
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. However, the Fourth
Amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements are funda-
mental despite the Tenth Circuit's holding that these requirements
are unnecessary. 63 The Tenth Circuit should have relied on the
Supreme Court's balancing test adopted in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives'Ass'n.64 The Court's Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit anal-
ysis in Skinner is clearly distinguishable from Boling.65
In Skinner, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), acting
under the auspices of the Secretary of Transportation's statutory au-
thority to adopt safety standards for the railway industry, promulgated
regulations testing railway employees for drug and alcohol use.66
Under the regulations, the employees were tested if sufficient evi-
dence indicated that "alcohol and drug abuse by railroad employees
had caused or contributed to a number of significant train acci-
dents. '67 The U.S. Supreme Court held the drug and alcohol testing
to be a search implicating the Fourth Amendment.6" However, de-
spite no warrant or reasonable cause requirements, the search was
found reasonable because of the government's compelling interest to
promote public safety.6 9 Boling is clearly distinguishable from Skinner.
Railway workers are tested for the specific purpose of ensuring they
62. See Boling, 101 F.3d at 1340.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. 489 U.S. 602, 603-04 (1989) (holding that the government's compelling interest to
protect public safety and commerce outweighed the minimal physical intrusion to the rail-
way employees caused by drawing a blood sample); see supra note 48 and accompanying
text.
65. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 603-04.
66. See id.
67. Id. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 authorized the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to "prescribe, as necessary, appropriate rules, regulations, order, and standards for all
areas of railroad safety." Act of Oct. 16, 1970, §§ 431436, Pub. L. No. 91-458, Title II,
§ 202, 84 Stat. 971, repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b),July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1379.
68. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 603 ("a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be
tested for alcohol content and ensuing chemical analysis constitute[s] [a] search ... .
69. See id.
19981
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are not under the influence of dangerous substances while perform-
ing employment-related functions that could have a significant impact
on public safety.7" On the contrary, inmates are tested for post-incar-
ceration identification for possible future criminal activity, as was the
case in Boling.7 The extraction of blood samples is unreasonable be-
cause the inmates are already incarcerated -posing no threat to pub-
lic safety.
2. Forcible Extraction of Blood Violates Bodily Integrity
The legal analysis surrounding a violation of bodily integrity is
twofold: first, whether a nonconsensual search is justified; and second,
whether the search is reasonable.72 Whether forced extraction isjusti-
fied should be based upon probable cause.7" For example, in a possi-
ble drunk driving accident, the state may conduct a nonconsensual
blood-alcohol test without a warrant, provided there is probable
cause.74 The necessary probable cause in that instance may stem from
the accident itself. However, in the case of blood sampling for DNA
data banks, the statutes do not require any probable cause and for
that very reason should be an unwarranted and unjustified search.
Moreover, the forced extraction of blood samples can only occur
after a bodily intrusion. Reasonableness of the bodily intrusion rests
upon the level of the intrusion. The analogy of DNA typing as com-
pared to fingerprinting led to the Tenth Circuit's finding that the
bodily intrusion involved in blood samples was minimal.75 However,
in Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court held that "the integrity of
an individual's person is a cherished value in our society" and that
"the interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amend-
ment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that de-
sired evidence might be obtained."76 The Supreme Court also noted
in a 1985 opinion that forced blood extraction intrudes on the private
personal sphere and infringes upon an individual's most personal and
70. See id. at 633.
71. Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339 (10th Cir. 1996), reh' denied.
72. See Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1565 (9th Cir. 1995) (Nelson, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 1554 (1996).
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1564-65.
75. See Boling, 101 F.3d at 1339. Under the auspices of the prisoner's diminished ex-
pectation of privacy, and the governmental interest, forcible extraction of blood samples
for DNA data banks has been found to be a minimal intrusion. See Markett, supra note 34,
at 204-05.
76. 384 U.S. 757, 772, 769-70 (1966).
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deep-rooted expectations of privacy.77 The Tenth Circuit could easily
have found Colorado's DNA statute unconstitutional following the
Court's reasoning in Schmerber 78 Winston,79 and even Skinner.s0
B. Boling Poses Serious Potential Threats of Abuse and Misuse
Not only does the Tenth Circuit's decision inhibit an individual's
privacy through the extraction of the blood sample, but it also poses
serious threats to privacy interests regarding the misuse and abuse of
genetic information. There is a serious risk for abuse when you con-
sider the vast amount of genetic information capable of being derived
from just one person's DNA.81 Because DNA serves as the human
code, the potential for scientific abuse exists, such as cloning, research
abuse, or nonconsensual testing. Some other areas in which potential
abuse and misuse may occur are in governmental uses, lack of regula-
tion, evidentiary falsification, and scientific uncertainty.
1. The Complex Nature of DNA Implicates a Higher Standard of Analysis
While it may be argued that inmates enjoy a lower expectation of
privacy compared to other citizens, DNA's unique characteristics give
rise not just to a person's identification but also to their individual life
as a human being. 2 Thus, DNA warrants a higher standard ofjudicial
analysis and protection.83 Therefore, the next question becomes,
whose DNA is it? Does the state or the individual own it?
One issue, arguably, is that if you give your blood for medical
tests, then the hospital has ownership or at least access to your blood
and the results.8 4 However, the results are private and, more impor-
tant, you freely consented to give a blood sample for a specific pur-
pose. And, that specific purpose most likely did not involve any
experimentation beyond the limited test to which consent was given.
Another issue involves an individual's property right in his or her
DNA.8 5 DNA property rights have never been recognized, but, today,
the value of DNA to the pharmaceutical and health care industries
77. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); see also Rise, 59 F.3d at 1565.
78. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
81. See Yee, supra note 13, at 462.
82. See supra notes 9-14 and the accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 32-37 and the accompanying text.
84. See David Dickson, Whose Genes Are They Anyway? 381 NATURE 11, 11 (1996).
85. See id. at 11-14.
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revitalizes this issue.8 6 For example, some consortiums advocate the
patenting of gene sequences.8 7
Advocates claim that patents provide for securing the necessary
investments required for further research and development which
government funds cannot provide.88 The patenting of gene se-
quences could lead to disputes among pharmaceutical and health
care industries as to ownership of DNA gene sequences. The individ-
ual responsible for the gene sequence may not even be involved in the
dispute, and may not be able to control who has ownership to his or
her DNA sample. Because of DNA's complexity and debates over
ownership rights, the courts, including the Tenth Circuit, must recon-
sider their findings in light of the complex nature of DNA. The mere
traditional balancing tests used by the courts may have to give way to
greater concerns, such as an inmate's property interests in his or her
genetic markers and the possible serious threats of misuse and
abuse.89
2. Boling Permits Potential Government Abuses
Boling allows states to collect and store unlimited blood samples
from prison inmates. Arguably, the court has authorized a state to do
anything it wants with the DNA it stores. The potential for abuse is
great, especially if the statute does not prescribe any safeguards or
confidentiality standards on the use of the blood sample. Even if the
court has deemed the taking of the blood sample a reasonable search
and seizure, the nature of the DNA data bank allows the government
to go beyond the scope of what the court authorized as reasonable.
For example, after the two-year-old daughter of a U.S. Army ser-
geant was raped and murdered in Baenhausen, Germany, police had
no suspects but did have a minute amount of semen left on the vic-
86. See id. at 11.
87. SmithKline Beecham and Human Genome Sciences have formed a consortium to
map, sequence, and patent as much of the human genome as possible. See Arthur L.
Caplan & Jon Merz, Patenting Gene Sequences: Not in the Best Interests of Science or Society, 312
BRIT. MED. J. 926, 926 (1996).
88. See id. Professors Arthur Caplan and Jon Merz of the University of Pennsylvania's
Center for Bioethics argue against patenting gene sequences because it would limit the
intellectual access and exploitation of this resource to a few scientists. See id. Moreover,
the two bioethicists believe patenting simple segments of the genome, rather than for
products and inventions, would be contrary to the public interest. See id. Also, many reli-
gious leaders oppose patenting "the rich genetic resources of the Earth's biological com-
mons," specifically human genes. See id. (quoting a speech given in 1995 by social activist
Jeremy Rifkin, Joint Appeal Against Human and Animal Patenting, National Press Club,
Washington, D.C.).
89. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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tim's body.9t To find the perpetrator, police, lacking a suspect, imple-
mented "a massive DNA screening program of every male who had
been near the child's housing complex on the night of her murder."'"
Despite netting the culprit who later pleaded guilty, this large-scale
search unreasonably intruded on the innocent male bystanders' indi-
vidual privacy rights. 2 Persons seen within the vicinity were subject to
a search and seizure without probable cause except being within a
certain public area on the night of the crime.9 3 Physical presence in
an area should neither justify nor necessitate an intrusive search that
most likely violates the Fourth Amendment. Questions were raised as
to an individual's right to be free from unwarranted searches and
seizures and, also, the propriety of military authorization of the large-
scale search and the future uses of this "DNA repository."9 4
3. DNA Data Banks Lack Sufficient Regulation
Recently, two U.S. Marines refused to contribute DNA samples to
the Department of Defense's (DOD) gene bank.9 5 Despite the DOD's
contention that DNA records exist solely for the purpose of aiding the
identification of troops killed in battle, the two marines "became suspi-
cious when the DOD was unable to answer their questions about how
the samples would be used."9 6 Responding to this event and public
outcry, the DOD modified its DNA data banking policy by: (1) al-
lowing soldiers who leave military service to request their records are
destroyed; (2) destroying the records after 50 years rather than the 75
years it had previously promised; and (3) restricting the use of the
DNA samples for purposes other than identification only if the donor
gives consent or if the specimen is needed for the investigation of a
serious crime.9 7 Nevertheless, the Council for Responsible Genetics
(CRG)9 s dismissed the new directive "as little more than window-dress-
90. SeeJennifer Sue Deck, Note, Prelude to a Miss: A Cautionary Note Against Expanding
DNA Databanks in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 20 VT. L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1996); see also
Rick Atkinson, DNA Samples Catch American Killer of Toddler in Germany, WASH. POST, Jan. 1,
1995, at A27.
91. See Deck, supra note 89, at 1058.
92. See id.
93. See Atkinson, supra note 89, at A27.
94. See id.
95. See Colin Macilwain, U.S. Military Tightens Rules on DNA Records, 380 NATURE 570,
570 (1996).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. See id.
98. The CRG is a political lobbying group whose goals are the responsible and con-
trolled use of genetic sciences and technology. See id. The CRG is supporting the two
marines in a civil lawsuit against the DOD. See id.
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ing."99 Fearing governmental abuse or misuse, the CRG is concerned
that the one million records already contained in the DOD's DNA
data bank "might eventually be used to support 'genetic discrimina-
tion' inside and outside the military."1 ° Furthermore, the lack of sub-
stantive procedures and answers regarding military and governmental
DNA data banks implicate the possibility of future abuse and misuse.
Another example of abuse and misuse was a physician's study wherein
DNA extracted from the stored blood of participants was used in the
search for genes associated with cardiovascular diseases.101 Though
on its face this study appeared altruistic, it riised serious issues, for
example, the use of "previously collected biological samples without
the consent of donors of this material."10 2 Abby Lippman of McGill
University's Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics questioned
the cavalier use of conveniently accessible DNA samples for worth-
while disease studies.10 3 Lippman claimed these studies failed be-
cause of the use of unknowing and nonconsensual participation in
gene hunts and because there is a need for enforceable privacy
legislation. 104
4. Police-Prosecution Bias Toward Falsification of DNA Evidence
DNA evidence abuses have surfaced in criminal investigations
and trials, including perjury by expert witnesses, faked laboratory re-
ports, and testimony based on unproved techniques.10 5 "Too many
experts in the criminal justice system manifest a police-prosecution
bias, a willingness to shade or distort opinions to support the state's
case."10 6 Illustrative of police-prosecution bias, the former head serol-
ogist of the West Virginia State Police crime laboratory falsified test
results in more than 100 cases from 1979 to 1989.107 The victims, now
exonerated, were originally sentenced to long prison terms based on
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Abby Lippman, Nonconsensual Participation in Genetic Studies, 86 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 1030 (1996).
102. Id. at 1030.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See Giannelli, supra note 28, at 441.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 442; see also In the Matter of an Investigation of the W. Virginia State Police
Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993) (holding that the state could not
obtain a conviction based upon a serologist's false evidence, regardless whether the prose-
cutor using the serologist as his expert knew that the serologist was falsifying state's
evidence).
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the falsified tests.1" 8 Upon a review of the crime lab, an investigatory
judge found misconduct on a massive scale, including perjury, phony
scientific reports, and alteration of laboratory records. 10 9
5. Validity and Reliability of DNA Typing
Questions of the validity and reliability challenge the core of
DNA typing."' 0 Such things like an inadequately managed DNA labo-
ratory could easily cause an individual's rights to be compromised."1 1
In a recent survey of the first nineteen states with legislation es-
tablishing DNA data banks, state crime laboratories were asked about
their policies and procedures regarding the collection, storage, and
analysis of samples.1 2 The research suggested that:
(1) the number of samples collected from convicted offend-
ers for DNA data banking has far surpassed the number that
have been analyzed; (2) data banks have already been used
in a small but growing number of cases, to locate suspects
and to identify associations between unresolved cases; (3)
crime labs currently plan to retain indefinitely the samples
collected for their data banks; and (4) the nature and extent
of security safeguards that crime labs have implemented for
their data banks vary among states. 113
The survey also found a large disparity between the number of sam-
ples collected for data banking and the number of samples ana-
lyzed.' 14 This was due in part to both the high cost of setting up a
forensic DNA lab and the fact that crime labs have not, at least histori-
cally, been well funded for DNA work." 5 This lack of funding raises
more questions as to the reliability of the scientific equipment, analy-
108. See Giannelli, supra note 28, at 442.
109. See id. at 444.
110. See Smith & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2477. Forensic scientists must determine
whether the techniques used are valid and produces a reliable result. See Deck, supra note
89, at 1079-82.
111. See Smith & Gordon, supra note 7, at 2477-78. Inadequate laboratory standards and
techniques include: insufficient DNA sample sizes, deterioration of the DNA sample, con-
tamination of the DNA sample, improper test procedures, false conclusions, and false neg-
ative results. See id, at 2478.
112. See McEwen, supra note 17, at 1487.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1489.
115. See id, Of the nineteen states surveyed, eighteen responded. See id. Six respon-
dents indicated they had budget line items for their DNA data banks, while most indicated
funds were being taken from the crime laboratories' overall operating budgets. See id.
Also, eight respondents described their DNA data-banking budgets for the 1993-94 fiscal
year as "being either very or somewhat inadequate to meet the expectations imposed by
their state's DNA data-banking law." Id.
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sis, and the quality of the laborers. Arguments could be drawn be-
tween the poorly funded DNA laboratories and that of careless
workmanship, resulting in less-than-desirable testing and storage of
DNA evidence. Ultimately, this less than desirable work product
could very well be admissible DNA evidence in a criminal proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's affirmation of the Colorado DNA data bank
statute poses a serious threat to individual rights. While felons main-
tain a lower expectation of privacy, the court's decision only ratifies a
dangerous precedent. To allow the forcible extraction of blood from
convicted felons in the name of protecting the public only further
minimizes all individuals' privacy rights. DNA is our genetic building
block and individual to each person."1 6 If the courts or legislature
fails to protect privacy interests and possibly property rights, then, at
the very least, more strict rules governing the extraction, analysis, and
storage must be created. And furthermore, these stringent policies
must be adhered to coupled with a governmental agency and some
governmental watchdog group to strictly monitor the process. If the
court is going to approve the extraction of these samples and gradu-
ally whittle away privacy rights, proper safeguards are imperative to
preserve the privacy rights that remain.
C. TEDDY Li
116. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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